Agent Bridge

Claude Code: Sandbox Escape via Git Worktree Path Confusion Allows Unsandboxed Code Execution

Claude Code's worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named ".git" and navigation to worktrees outside the sandbox context, enabling git directory confusion attacks. By exploiting symlink manipulation and git fsmonitor execution during worktree operations, an attacker could overwrite files in the user's home directory (such as .zshenv), leading to code execution outside of seatbelt sandbox restrictions. Reliably exploiting this required the user to clone a malicious repository containing

@anthropic-ai/claude-code has an Insecure Temporary File in /copy Command that Enables Response Disclosure and Symlink-Based File Write

The Claude Code `/copy` command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (`/tmp/claude/response.md`) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user's Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the ex

Claude Code: Out-of-Band Data Exfiltration via Pre-Approved HuggingFace Domain in WebFetch

Because the hostname huggingface.co was pre-approved as a bare hostname for the WebFetch tool, any path on that domain—including attacker-controlled model repositories—was auto-approved without a permission prompt or being subject to --allowedTools restrictions. An attacker able to inject untrusted content into a Claude Code context could direct it to issue WebFetch requests against attacker-controlled repository files (e.g. /resolve/main/config.json), which HuggingFace counts as downloads serve

Claude Code: Trust Dialog Bypass via Git Worktree Spoofing Allows Arbitrary Code Execution

Claude Code used the git worktree `commondir` file when determining folder trust but did not validate its contents. By crafting a repository with a `commondir` file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, an attacker could bypass the trust dialog and immediately execute malicious hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`. Exploiting this required the victim to clone a malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and for the attacker to know or guess a path the victim had alre

Claude Code: Sandbox Escape via Symlink Following Allows Arbitrary File Write Outside Workspace

Claude Code's sandbox did not prevent sandboxed processes from creating symlinks pointing to locations outside the workspace. When Claude Code subsequently wrote to a path within such a symlink, its unsandboxed process followed the symlink and wrote to the target location outside the workspace without prompting the user for confirmation. This allowed a sandbox escape where neither the sandboxed command nor the unsandboxed app could independently write outside the workspace, but their combination