AiToEarn

pnpm has Path Traversal via arbitrary file permission modification

### Summary When pnpm processes a package's `directories.bin` field, it uses `path.join()` without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify `"directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"}` to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations. **Note:** Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (`fixBin` gated by `EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED`). ### Details Vulnerable code in `pkg-manager/package-bins/src

pnpm: Binary ZIP extraction allows arbitrary file write via path traversal (Zip Slip)

### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's binary fetcher allows malicious packages to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability has two attack vectors: (1) Malicious ZIP entries containing `../` or absolute paths that escape the extraction root via AdmZip's `extractAllTo`, and (2) The `BinaryResolution.prefix` field is concatenated into the extraction path without validation, allowing a crafted prefix like `../../evil` to redirect extracted files outsid

pnpm has Windows-specific tarball Path Traversal

### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's tarball extraction allows malicious packages to write files outside the package directory on Windows. The path normalization only checks for `./` but not `.\`. On Windows, backslashes are directory separators, enabling path traversal. **This vulnerability is Windows-only.** ### Details **1. Incomplete Path Normalization (`store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts:107-110`)** ```typescript if (fileName.includes('./')) { fileName = path.posix.join('/'

pnpm scoped bin name Path Traversal allows arbitrary file creation outside node_modules/.bin

### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking allows malicious npm packages to create executable shims or symlinks outside of `node_modules/.bin`. Bin names starting with `@` bypass validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like `../../` remain intact. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the bin name validation and normalization logic: **1. Validation Bypass (`pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts`)** The filter allows any bin name starting wit

pnpm has symlink traversal in file:/git dependencies

### Summary When pnpm installs a `file:` (directory) or `git:` dependency, it follows symlinks and reads their target contents without constraining them to the package root. A malicious package containing a symlink to an absolute path (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) causes pnpm to copy that file's contents into `node_modules`, leaking local data. **Preconditions:** Only affects `file:` and `git:` dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are NOT affe