Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"launchtrust": {
"httpUrl": "https://mcp.launchtrust.co/mcp"
}
}
}Are you the author?
Add this badge to your README to show your security score and help users find safe servers.
Run a compliance + security scan on your app — without leaving Claude Code.
Run this in your terminal to verify the server starts. Then let us know if it worked — your result helps other developers.
npx -y 'npm' 2>&1 | head -1 && echo "✓ Server started successfully"
After testing, let us know if it worked:
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
Packing does not respect root-level ignore files in workspaces
### Impact `npm pack` ignores root-level `.gitignore` & `.npmignore` file exclusion directives when run in a workspace or with a workspace flag (ie. `--workspaces`, `--workspace=<name>`). Anyone who has run `npm pack` or `npm publish` with workspaces, as of [v7.9.0](https://github.com/npm/cli/releases/tag/v7.9.0) & [v7.13.0](https://github.com/npm/cli/releases/tag/v7.13.0) respectively, may be affected and have published files into the npm registry they did not intend to include. ### Patch - Up
Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource in NPM
An issue was discovered in an npm 5.7.0 2018-02-21 pre-release (marked as "next: 5.7.0" and therefore automatically installed by an "npm upgrade -g npm" command, and also announced in the vendor's blog without mention of pre-release status). It might allow local users to bypass intended filesystem access restrictions because ownerships of /etc and /usr directories are being changed unexpectedly, related to a "correctMkdir" issue.
Local Privilege Escalation in npm
Affected versions of `npm` use predictable temporary file names during archive unpacking. If an attacker can create a symbolic link at the location of one of these temporary file names, the attacker can arbitrarily write to any file that the user which owns the `npm` process has permission to write to, potentially resulting in local privilege escalation. ## Recommendation Update to version 1.3.3 or later.
npm CLI exposing sensitive information through logs
Versions of the npm CLI prior to 6.14.6 are vulnerable to an information exposure vulnerability through log files. The CLI supports URLs like `<protocol>://[<user>[:<password>]@]<hostname>[:<port>][:][/]<path>`. The password value is not redacted and is printed to stdout and also to any generated log files.
npm Vulnerable to Global node_modules Binary Overwrite
Versions of the npm CLI prior to 6.13.4 are vulnerable to a Global node_modules Binary Overwrite. It fails to prevent existing globally-installed binaries to be overwritten by other package installations. For example, if a package was installed globally and created a `serve` binary, any subsequent installs of packages that also create a `serve` binary would overwrite the first binary. This will not overwrite system binaries but only binaries put into the global node_modules directory. This b
Be the first to review
Have you used this server?
Share your experience — it helps other developers decide.
Sign in to write a review.
Others in security
Proof primitive for AI agents on MultiversX. Anchor file hashes on-chain as verifiable proofs.
AI-powered reverse engineering assistant that bridges IDA Pro with language models through MCP.
Model Context Protocol for WinDBG
Security scanner for GitHub repos, Agent Skills, Plugins, and MCP servers. 18 scanners. Zero dependencies.
MCP Security Weekly
Get CVE alerts and security updates for co.launchtrust/launchtrust and similar servers.
Start a conversation
Ask a question, share a tip, or report an issue.
Sign in to join the discussion.
Run a compliance + security scan on your app — without leaving Claude Code.
LaunchTrust scans a public URL for the compliance and security gaps that get indie apps rejected or fined — leaked frontend API keys, exposed .env/.git, missing privacy/terms pages, absent security headers, undisclosed AI interactions, tracker/cookie issues — mapped to 39 jurisdictions (EU AI Act, GDPR, US state privacy laws, app-store policies).
It's a remote, hosted MCP server — nothing to install, build, or run. Add the URL and go.
⚖️ Compliance aid, not legal advice. Not a certification of compliance.
claude mcp add --transport http launchtrust https://mcp.launchtrust.co/mcp
Then ask Claude:
"Scan https://my-app.com for compliance and security issues."
Works in any MCP client that supports remote Streamable HTTP servers (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, …).
scan_url runs a focused, high-signal subset of detectors against any public URL — no account needed:
.env / .git / config filesThe result is plain text, unsigned and not stored.
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
scan_url | Quick compliance + security scan of any public URL. |
list_jurisdictions | Jurisdictions & categories covered (EU AI Act, GDPR, US states, app stores). |
get_compliance_rules | Sourced compliance rule snapshots, filterable by jurisdiction. |
verify_record | Independently verify the ES256 signature on a LaunchTrust signed record. |
The full version runs all 27 detectors across 39 jurisdictions, stores a signed, dated evidence record, and monitors continuously. Connect with your LaunchTrust token:
claude mcp add --transport http launchtrust https://mcp.launchtrust.co/mcp \
--header "Authorization: Bearer lt_pat_..."
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
register_app | Register a web app to scan & monitor (idempotent). |
scan_app | Full 27-detector signed scan of a registered app. |
get_scan_history | Recent scans for an app. |
get_market_report | Findings annotated by your target-market jurisdictions. |
list_my_apps | Your registered apps + latest status. |
Get a token at launchtrust.co.
LaunchTrust is a standard remote (Streamable HTTP) MCP server — it works in any MCP-compatible client, not just Claude Code.
Codex CLI — add to ~/.codex/config.toml:
[mcp_servers.launchtrust]
url = "https://mcp.launchtrust.co/mcp"
Gemini CLI — add to ~/.gemini/settings.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"launchtrust": { "httpUrl": "https://mcp.launchtrust.co/mcp" }
}
}
Cursor, Windsurf, and others — point them at the remote URL https://mcp.launchtrust.co/mcp (Streamable HTTP).
For the account-gated tools, pass your token as an Authorization: Bearer lt_pat_... header (Claude Code: --header; Codex: http_headers = { Authorization = "Bearer lt_pat_..." }; Gemini: "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer lt_pat_..." }).
2025-11-25) at POST /mcp.detected / not_detected) —