com.tulimoa/platform

pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

## Summary The virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using `path.join(modules, pkgName)` where `pkgName` is extracted from lockfile `packages` keys via `dp.parse(depPath).name` without validation. A crafted `pnpm-lock.yaml` with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., `../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0`) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during `pnpm install`. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv — the `safeJoinModulesDir` conta

pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install

## Summary When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved **manifest `name`** as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose `package.json` `name` is a scoped path traversal (`@x/../../…/<abs path>`) is therefore extracted **outside `node_modules`**, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can **overwrite existing files** there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → **code execution** (e.g. `~/.zshrc`, `.gi

pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml

## Summary pnpm expands `${VAR}` environment placeholders in the `httpProxy` / `httpsProxy` / `noProxy` settings read from a project's `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs `pnpm install` in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as `NPM_TOKEN` or `GITHUB_TOKEN`. This bypasses a trust boundary

pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml

## Summary pnpm expands `${VAR}` environment placeholders in the `httpProxy` / `httpsProxy` / `noProxy` settings read from a project's `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs `pnpm install` in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as `NPM_TOKEN` or `GITHUB_TOKEN`. This bypasses a trust boundary

pnpm: pacquet trust-lockfile install can create dependency symlinks outside the project

## Summary A crafted lockfile alias could reach several install-time filesystem joins. With `--trust-lockfile` or a frozen lockfile, traversal segments could create links outside the intended project or `node_modules` boundary. This patch validates dependency names and every virtual-store slot before creating directories, links, bins, or hoisted entries. ## Security boundary - A shared safe-join helper rejects traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved dependency names before filesy