Governance gateway for AI agents — bounded, auditable, session-aware control with MCP proxy, shell proxy & HTTP API. Works with Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, and any MCP-compatible agent.
Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"deterministic-agent-control-protocol": {
"args": [
"-y",
"det-acp"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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A governance gateway for AI agents — making every action bounded, auditable, reversible, and explainable.
This server supports HTTP transport. Be the first to test it — help the community know if it works.
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
No known CVEs.
Checked det-acp against OSV.dev.
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A governance gateway for AI agents — making every action bounded, auditable, reversible, and explainable.
Works transparently with Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, and any MCP-compatible agent. Also supports shell command governance and a language-agnostic HTTP API.
1. Set Up Governance Rule Enable the governance rule in Cursor's settings to protect your workspace. | |
2. Block Secrets Exfiltration Agent attempts to read .env and write secrets — blocked instantly.
|
3. Block Credential Scanning Agent tries to search for credentials and secrets files — denied by policy. |
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ec7a9524-1527-4e51-b837-7e05a24b189d
Agents never execute tools directly. Every action flows through the control plane for evaluation, enforcement, and audit:
flowchart LR
A["Agent"] -->|"action request"| CP["Control Protocol"]
CP -->|"evaluate against policy"| D{"Decision"}
D -->|"allow"| E["Agent Executes Action"]
D -->|"deny"| F["Blocked + Reason Logged"]
D -->|"gate"| G["Human Approval Required"]
E -->|"record result"| L["Evidence Ledger"]
G -->|"approved"| E
The protocol does not execute actions itself. It evaluates them against a policy, enforces session-level budgets, requires human approval for risky operations, and records everything in a tamper-evident audit ledger.
| Principle | Description |
|---|---|
| Bounded | Agents can only perform allowed action |