This Guidance demonstrates how to securely run Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers on the AWS Cloud using containerized architecture. It helps organizations implement industry-standard OAuth 2.0 authentication while protecting server deployments with multiple security layers, including content delivery networks and web application firewalls.
Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"guidance-for-deploying-model-context-protocol-servers-on-aws": {
"args": [
"-y",
"aws-cdk"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
uv is vulnerable to arbitrary file write through entry point names
### Impact In versions of uv prior to 0.11.15, when installing a distribution containing an entry point specification (under `console_scripts` or `gui_scripts`), uv would place the generated entry point according to the given name even if doing so resulted in a path outside of the environment's scripts directory. A malicious wheel could use this to place an executable outside of the intended environment, including in a directory already present on the user's `PATH`. This could shadow or overwr
uv vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion through RECORD entries
## Impact Wheel RECORD entries can contain relative paths that traverse outside of the wheel’s installation prefix. In versions 0.11.5 and earlier of uv, these wheels were not rejected on installation and the RECORD was respected without validation on uninstall. uv uses the RECORD to determine files to remove on uninstall. Consequently, a malicious or malformed wheel could induce deletion of arbitrary files outside of the wheel’s installation prefix on uninstall. uv does not use the RECORD fi
uv allows ZIP payload obfuscation through parsing differentials
### Impact In versions 0.9.5 and earlier of uv, ZIP archives were handled in a manner that enabled two parsing differentials against other components of the Python packaging ecosystem: 1. Central directory entries in a ZIP archive can contain comment fields. However, uv would assume that these fields were not present, since they aren't widely used. Consequently, a ZIP archive could be constructed where uv would interpret the contents of a central directory comment field as ZIP control structur
uv has differential in tar extraction with PAX headers
### Impact In versions 0.9.4 and earlier of uv, tar archives containing PAX headers with file size overrides were not handled properly. As a result, an attacker could contrive a source distribution (as a tar archive) that would extract differently when installed via uv versus other Python package installers. The underlying parsing differential here originates with astral-tokio-tar, which disclosed this vulnerability as CVE-2025-62518. In practice, the impact of this vulnerability is **low**:
uv allows ZIP payload obfuscation through parsing differentials
## Impact In versions 0.8.5 and earlier of uv, remote ZIP archives were handled in a streamwise fashion, and file entries were not reconciled against the archive's central directory. This enabled two parser differentials against other Python package installers: 1. An attacker could contrive a ZIP archive that would extract with legitimate contents on some package installers, and malicious contents on others due to multiple local file entries. The attacker could choose which installer to target
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This guidance demonstrates how to deploy Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers on AWS with secure authentication using Amazon Cognito, implementing the 2025-06-18 MCP specification with OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata (RFC9728). It enables you to host MCP servers that can be accessed remotely while maintaining security through standards-compliant OAuth 2.0 authentication flows.
The solution addresses several key challenges:

The architecture implements:
You are responsible for the cost of the AWS services used while running this Guidance. As of August 2025, the cost for running this Guidance with the default settings in the US East (N. Virginia) Region is approximately $194.18 per month for processing moderate traffic levels.
We recommend creating a Budget through AWS Cost Explorer to help manage costs. Prices are subject to change. For full details, refer to the pricing webpage for each AWS service used in this Guidance.
The following table provides a sample cost breakdown for deploying this Guidance with the default parameters in the US East (N. Virginia) Region for one month.
| AWS service | Dimensions | Cost [USD] |
|---|---|---|
| VPC (NAT Gateway) | 1 NAT Gateway × 730 hours + 100 GB data processing | $37.35 |
| Elastic Load Balancing | Application Load Balancer with moderate traffic | $16.83 |
| Amazon Cognito | 10,500 MAUs (within 50,000 free tier) | $0.00 |
| CloudFront | 2 TB data transfer + 15M requests | $87.96 |
| WAF | 2 Web ACLs (CloudFront and Regional) | $10.00 |
| ECS (Fargate) | 1 vCPU, 2GB memory × 730 hours | $36.04 |
| Secrets Manager | 1 secret for Cognito credentials | $0.40 |
| Lambda | Custom resources (minimal usage) | $0.20 |
| Total | $194.18/month |
These d