Go from natural language to verified finite state machines — topology bugs caught before code runs.
Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"orca": {
"env": {
"ORCA_API_KEY": "<your-api-key>",
"ORCA_PROVIDER": "anthropic"
},
"args": [
"-y",
"@orcalang/orca-mcp-server"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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Orchestrated State Machine Language — a two-layer architecture for reliable LLM code generation.
Run this in your terminal to verify the server starts. Then let us know if it worked — your result helps other developers.
npx -y 'pnpm' 2>&1 | head -1 && echo "✓ Server started successfully"
After testing, let us know if it worked:
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
pnpm has Path Traversal via arbitrary file permission modification
### Summary When pnpm processes a package's `directories.bin` field, it uses `path.join()` without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify `"directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"}` to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations. **Note:** Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (`fixBin` gated by `EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED`). ### Details Vulnerable code in `pkg-manager/package-bins/src
pnpm: Binary ZIP extraction allows arbitrary file write via path traversal (Zip Slip)
### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's binary fetcher allows malicious packages to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability has two attack vectors: (1) Malicious ZIP entries containing `../` or absolute paths that escape the extraction root via AdmZip's `extractAllTo`, and (2) The `BinaryResolution.prefix` field is concatenated into the extraction path without validation, allowing a crafted prefix like `../../evil` to redirect extracted files outsid
pnpm has Windows-specific tarball Path Traversal
### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's tarball extraction allows malicious packages to write files outside the package directory on Windows. The path normalization only checks for `./` but not `.\`. On Windows, backslashes are directory separators, enabling path traversal. **This vulnerability is Windows-only.** ### Details **1. Incomplete Path Normalization (`store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts:107-110`)** ```typescript if (fileName.includes('./')) { fileName = path.posix.join('/'
pnpm scoped bin name Path Traversal allows arbitrary file creation outside node_modules/.bin
### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking allows malicious npm packages to create executable shims or symlinks outside of `node_modules/.bin`. Bin names starting with `@` bypass validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like `../../` remain intact. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the bin name validation and normalization logic: **1. Validation Bypass (`pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts`)** The filter allows any bin name starting wit
pnpm has symlink traversal in file:/git dependencies
### Summary When pnpm installs a `file:` (directory) or `git:` dependency, it follows symlinks and reads their target contents without constraining them to the package root. A malicious package containing a symlink to an absolute path (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) causes pnpm to copy that file's contents into `node_modules`, leaking local data. **Preconditions:** Only affects `file:` and `git:` dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are NOT affe
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Orchestrated State Machine Language — a two-layer architecture for reliable LLM code generation.
The core insight: LLMs generate flat transition tables reliably, but they struggle to guarantee topology correctness on their own. Orca separates program structure (state machine topology) from computation (action functions), then verifies the structure automatically before any code runs.
Machines are written in plain Markdown — a format LLMs can read and write natively.
# machine PaymentProcessor
## context
| Field | Type | Default |
|-------------|---------|---------|
| order_id | string | |
| amount | decimal | |
| retry_count | int | 0 |
## events
- submit_payment
- payment_authorized
- payment_declined
- retry_requested
- settlement_confirmed
## state idle [initial]
> Waiting for a payment submission
## state authorizing
> Waiting for payment gateway response
- on_entry: send_authorization_request
## state declined
> Payment was declined
## state settled [final]
> Payment fully settled
## transitions
| Source | Event | Guard | Target | Action |
|-------------|----------------------|------------|-------------|------------------|
| idle | submit_payment | | authorizing | |
| authorizing | payment_authorized | | settled | |
| authorizing | payment_declined | | declined | |
| declined | retry_requested | can_retry | authorizing | increment_retry |
| declined | retry_requested | !can_retry | settled | record_failure |
## guards
| Name | Expression |
|-----------|-------------------------|
| can_retry | `ctx.retry_count < 3` |
## actions
| Name | Signature | Effect |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------|
| send_authorization_request | `(ctx) -> Context` | AuthRequest |
| increment_retry | `(ctx) -> Context` | |
| record_failure | `(ctx) -> Context` | |
## effects
| Name | Input | Output |
|-------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| AuthRequest | `{ order_id: string, amount: decimal }` | `{ token: string }` |
The verifier checks this before anything runs: reachability, deadlocks, guard determinism, orphan declarations, and effect consistency.
Language
[initial] / [final] markers, descriptions, on_entry / on_exit actionsall-final / any-final / custom sync strategiestimeout: 30s -> state_nameignore: EVENT_NAME.orca.md separated by ---## effects section: named I/O schemas for external side effectsVerifier