Supply chain risk scoring for npm, PyPI, Cargo, and Go. 9 tools. Behavioral signals.
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Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"commit": {
"url": "https://poc-backend.amdal-dev.workers.dev/mcp",
"type": "streamable-http"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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An MCP server and web tool that scores npm packages, PyPI packages, Rust crates, Go modules, and GitHub repos on behavioral commitment — signals that are harder to fake than stars, READMEs, or download counts.
Run this in your terminal to verify the server starts. Then let us know if it worked — your result helps other developers.
npx -y 'proof-of-commitment' 2>&1 | head -1 && echo "✓ Server started successfully"
After testing, let us know if it worked:
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
LiteLLM: Custom Code Guardrails production endpoints bypass code safety checks
### Impact LiteLLM's Custom Code Guardrails production create/update paths did not apply the same sandboxing and validation used by the test endpoint. A privileged user with access to create or update guardrails could submit custom Python code that executed in the LiteLLM proxy environment. In deployments without a configured master key, callers could be treated as proxy administrators, making this reachable without intended administrative authorization. This could allow arbitrary code execut
LiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough Fallback
### Impact LiteLLM's MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint could allow an unauthenticated attacker to establish an authenticated MCP session using an arbitrary Bearer token. The MCP auth handler supported OAuth2 passthrough for upstream MCP servers, but the fallback path could replace failed LiteLLM key validation with an empty `UserAPIKeyAuth()` object. This allowed requests with a fabricated `Authorization` header to reach MCP tooling without a valid LiteLLM key. An attacker could use this to list a
LiteLLM: Local file read via request-supplied OIDC file references
### Impact LiteLLM's `/health/test_connection` endpoint resolved request-supplied environment and OIDC file references in `litellm_params`. A proxy administrator, or another privileged caller with permission to test model connections, could cause LiteLLM to read files from the local filesystem via an `oidc/file/` reference. Because exploitation requires privileged proxy access, this is treated as a defense-in-depth issue rather than a cross-tenant privilege bypass. ### Patches The issue is f
LiteLLM: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in Skills archive extraction
### Impact LiteLLM Skills archive extraction did not sufficiently validate file paths from uploaded skill ZIP archives. An authenticated user with access to LiteLLM LLM API routes, or a key whose `allowed_routes` includes `/v1/skills`, `anthropic_routes`, or `llm_api_routes`, could upload a crafted skill archive containing path traversal entries. When the skill was processed for execution, those entries could be written outside the intended extraction/staging directory. This could allow arbitr
LiteLLM allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint
LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint. While the endpoint correctly restricts users to updating only their own account, it does not restrict which fields may be changed. A user who can reach this endpoint can set their role to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative access to LiteLLM including all users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history. Users with the org_admin role have legitimate access to this endpoint and can exploit this
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Stars lie. Behavioral signals don't.
An MCP server and web tool that scores npm packages, PyPI packages, Rust crates, Go modules, and GitHub repos on behavioral commitment — signals that are harder to fake than stars, READMEs, or download counts.
$ npx proof-of-commitment axios zod chalk lodash minimatch
Scoring 5 npm packages... done in 3.0s
Package Risk Score Publishers Downloads Age Provenance
chalk 🔴 CRITICAL 72 1 432.9M/wk 14.6y —
minimatch 🔴 CRITICAL 78 1 634.1M/wk 14.9y —
lodash 🔴 CRITICAL 80 1 158.9M/wk 14.1y —
zod 🔴 CRITICAL 83 1 161.2M/wk 6.3y 🔐 verified
axios 🔴 CRITICAL 88 1 115.7M/wk 11.8y 🔐 verified
⚠ COMPROMISED — axios token theft (2026-03-30)
⚠ 5 CRITICAL packages found.
CRITICAL = sole npm publisher + >10M weekly downloads (publish-access concentration risk)
npm audit flags none of these. They're not vulnerabilities — they're attack-surface concentration. One stolen npm token, one phished maintainer, and a single push reaches the whole ecosystem (axios, March 30 2026 — happened).
26 of the 91 npm packages with >10M weekly downloads have a single npm publisher. Together they account for over 3 billion downloads per week. npm audit doesn't surface this. Stars don't either.
Four packages in a typical Node.js project are CRITICAL right now:
They won't appear in your package.json either — but these are in almost every project:
Behavioral signals surface this. Stars and READMEs don't.
No login required. Add to any MCP-compatible AI tool and start querying supply chain risk.
Claude Desktop
Open ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS (config file reference) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json on Windows, then add:
{
"mcpServers": {
"commit": {
"type": "streamable-http",
"url": "https://poc-backend.amdal-dev.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
}
Restart Claude Desktop. A tool icon appears in the chat input — ask it to audit your package.json.
Cursor
Open ~/.cursor/mcp.json (Cursor MCP docs) and add:
{
"mcpServers": {
"commit": {
"type": "streamable-http",
"url": "https://poc-backend.amdal-dev.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
}
Smithery (once indexed)
npx -y @smithery/cli install proof-of-commitment --client claude
Terminal (zero install):
# New in v1.8.0: zero-arg auto-detect — cd into any project, run once:
npx proof-of-commitment
# Picks the highest-coverage manifest in cwd (package-lock.json > yarn.lock >
# pnpm-lock.yaml > pnpm-workspace.yaml > package.json; requirements.txt;
# Cargo.toml; go.sum > go.mod). When multiple ecosystems are present, the
# file with the most recent mtime wins.
# Explicit package list still works:
... [View full README on GitHub](https://github.com/piiiico/proof-of-commitment#readme)