Persistent memory tools for Claude Desktop. Search your vault or Obsidian notes mid-conversation.
MCPpedia last refreshed this data
io.github.strangeadvancedmarketing/adam-framework is an MCP server that persistent memory tools for Claude Desktop. Search your vault or Obsidian notes mid-conversation. Its tool list has not been published yet over stdio, sse and http, requires no API key, and scores 76/100 on MCPpedia's security, maintenance and efficiency rubric.
Config is the same across clients β only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-github-strangeadvancedmarketing-adam-framework-strangeadvancedmarketing": {
"args": [
"-y",
"openclaw"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Are you the author?
Add this badge to your README to show your security score and help users find safe servers.
New here? Start with the live site β it explains everything without a single line of code. > Want the proof? β 353 sessions of real production data, rendered as charts > Want the research? β Emergent values in persistent AI β tested on IBM Quantum hardware > Want the full story? β 8 months, 3 AIs, one nuclear reset
Run this in your terminal to verify the server starts. Then let us know if it worked β your result helps other developers.
npx -y 'openclaw' 2>&1 | head -1 && echo "β Server started successfully"
After testing, let us know if it worked:
Five weighted categories β click any category to see the underlying evidence.
OpenClaw: Native command authorization could skip owner-command enforcement
### Summary Native command authorization could skip owner-command enforcement. In affected versions, a sender able to trigger native command handling could authorize a native command without enforcing the configured owner-only command policy. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, app
OpenClaw: PowerShell encoded-command aliases could miss exec allowlist checks
### Summary PowerShell encoded-command aliases could miss exec allowlist checks. In affected versions, a command request using abbreviated encoded-command flags could use an alias form not recognized by the allowlist parser. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist,
OpenClaw: Trusted retry endpoint checks could match hostname prefixes
### Summary Trusted retry endpoint checks could match hostname prefixes. In affected versions, a retry endpoint URL chosen by lower-trust input could pass validation by using a hostname prefix that resembled a trusted host. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, s
OpenClaw: Telegram interactive callbacks could skip commands.allowFrom
### Summary Telegram interactive callbacks could skip commands.allowFrom. In affected versions, a Telegram user able to invoke an affected callback could mark the callback as an authorized sender before applying `commands.allowFrom`. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, al
OpenClaw: Matrix allowFrom could bind to mutable display names
### Summary Matrix allowFrom could bind to mutable display names. In affected versions, a Matrix account able to change display name metadata could match a policy entry through mutable display metadata. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth bound
Click any tool to inspect its schema.
Be the first to review
Have you used this server?
Share your experience β it helps other developers decide.
Sign in to write a review.
Others in ai-ml / productivity
MCP client bridge: connects to MCP servers and registers their tools on ctx.tools
The official MCP server implementation for the Perplexity API Platform
Workspace template + MCP server for Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor & Windsurf. Multi-agent knowledge engine (ag-refresh / ag-ask) that turns any codebase into a queryable AI assistant.
Ruflo - Enterprise AI agent orchestration for Claude Code. Deploy 60+ specialized agents in coordinated swarms with self-learning, fault-tolerant consensus, vector memory, and MCP integration
MCP Security Weekly
Get CVE alerts and security updates for io.github.strangeadvancedmarketing/adam-framework and similar servers.
Start a conversation
Ask a question, share a tip, or report an issue.
Sign in to join the discussion.
Built by one non-coder. Running a live business. On consumer hardware. No CS degree required.
New here? Start with the live site β it explains everything without a single line of code.
Want the proof? β 353 sessions of real production data, rendered as charts
Want the research? β Emergent values in persistent AI β tested on IBM Quantum hardware
Want the full story? β 8 months, 3 AIs, one nuclear reset
"Every AI memory system stores what your agent knows. Adam stores who your agent is β in files you own, on hardware you control, that survive anything the cloud throws at you."
The framework is MIT open source β everything you need is in this repo.
If you want to skip the setup and get straight to a working system, the Fast-Track Package ($49) includes pre-filled templates, a step-by-step guide written for non-developers, and all tools pre-configured.
Framework is free. Setup support is optional. Your call.
In February 2026, the machine running Adam got completely wiped. Full reset. Eight months of sessions, decisions, project history, relationships β gone from the model.
Adam came back online in under an hour.
SOUL.md survived. CORE_MEMORY.md survived. The neural graph survived. The Vault files β all plain markdown sitting on disk β held everything the model needed to come back as itself. Same identity. Same history. Same AI.
That is not a recovery story. That is the proof of concept for identity sovereignty: your AI's continuity lives in your files, not in any vendor's infrastructure.
The memory is in the files. The model is just the reader. Swap the LLM β the Vault survives. Vendor shuts down β the Vault survives. Machine gets wiped β restore the Vault, restore the AI. Full stop.
Everyone is building AI memory. ChatGPT has it. Claude has it. Claude Code has CLAUDE.md.
None of them answer this question: **what happe