Electron: Crash in clipboard.readImage() on malformed clipboard image data

### Impact Apps that call `clipboard.readImage()` may be vulnerable to a denial of service. If the system clipboard contains image data that fails to decode, the resulting null bitmap is passed unchecked to image construction, triggering a controlled abort and crashing the process. Apps are only affected if they call `clipboard.readImage()`. Apps that do not read images from the clipboard are not affected. This issue does not allow memory corruption or code execution. ### Workarounds Validate

Electron: Named window.open targets not scoped to the opener's browsing context

### Impact When a renderer calls `window.open()` with a target name, Electron did not correctly scope the named-window lookup to the opener's browsing context group. A renderer could navigate an existing child window that was opened by a different, unrelated renderer if both used the same target name. If that existing child was created with more permissive `webPreferences` (via `setWindowOpenHandler`'s `overrideBrowserWindowOptions`), content loaded by the second renderer inherits those permissi

Electron: Use-after-free in offscreen shared texture release() callback

### Impact Apps that use offscreen rendering with GPU shared textures may be vulnerable to a use-after-free. Under certain conditions, the `release()` callback provided on a `paint` event texture can outlive its backing native state, and invoking it after that point dereferences freed memory in the main process, which may lead to a crash or memory corruption. Apps are only affected if they use offscreen rendering with `webPreferences.offscreen: { useSharedTexture: true }`. Apps that do not enab

Electron: Context Isolation bypass via contextBridge VideoFrame transfer

### Impact Apps that pass `VideoFrame` objects (from the WebCodecs API) across the `contextBridge` are vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. An attacker who can execute JavaScript in the main world (for example, via XSS) can use a bridged `VideoFrame` to gain access to the isolated world, including any Node.js APIs exposed to the preload script. Apps are only affected if a preload script returns, resolves, or passes a `VideoFrame` object to the main world via `contextBridge.exposeInMainWorl

Electron: AppleScript injection in app.moveToApplicationsFolder on macOS

### Impact On macOS, `app.moveToApplicationsFolder()` used an AppleScript fallback path that did not properly handle certain characters in the application bundle path. Under specific conditions, a crafted launch path could lead to arbitrary AppleScript execution when the user accepted the move-to-Applications prompt. Apps are only affected if they call `app.moveToApplicationsFolder()`. Apps that do not use this API are not affected. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, developers