Jupyter Mcp Server

JupyterLab's command linker attributes in HTML enable one-click command execution from untrusted content

JupyterLab's HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submit

JupyterHub has an Extension Manager API/GUI Policy Discrepancy, allowing 3rd party (malicious) extensions install via POST request

The allow-list of extensions that can be installed from PyPI Extension Manager (`allowed_extensions_uris`) is not correctly enforced by JupyterLab prior to 4.5.X. The PyPI Extension Manager was not contained to packages listed on the default PyPI index. This has security implications for deployments that: - have allow-listed specific extensions with aim to prevent users from installing packages - have the kernel and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts (thus no access to install pack

Jupyter Notebook Vulnerable to Authentication Token Theft via CommandLinker XSS

### Impact A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Jupyter Notebook allows attackers to steal authentication tokens from users who open malicious notebook files and interact with elements that the attacker can make look indistinguishable from legitimate controls (single click interaction). The vulnerability enables complete account takeover through the Jupyter REST API, allowing the attacker to: 1. Read all files 2. Modify/create files 3. Access running kernels and execute arbitra

JupyterLab LaTeX typesetter links did not enforce `noopener` attribute

Links generated with LaTeX typesetters in Markdown files and Markdown cells in JupyterLab and Jupyter Notebook did not include the `noopener` attribute. This is deemed to have no impact on the default installations. Theoretically users of third-party LaTeX-rendering extensions could find themselves vulnerable to reverse tabnabbing attacks if: - links generated by those extensions included `target=_blank` (no such extensions are known at time of writing) and - they were to click on a link genera

HTML injection in Jupyter Notebook and JupyterLab leading to DOM Clobbering

### Impact The vulnerability depends on user interaction by opening a malicious notebook with Markdown cells, or Markdown file using JupyterLab preview feature. A malicious user can access any data that the attacked user has access to as well as perform arbitrary requests acting as the attacked user. ### Patches JupyterLab v3.6.8, v4.2.5 and Jupyter Notebook v7.2.2 were patched. ### Workarounds There is no workaround for the underlying DOM Clobbering susceptibility. However, select plugins