Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"macos-mcp": {
"url": "https://<host>:8000/mcp/",
"type": "http",
"oauth": {
"clientId": "my-client",
"clientSecret": "my-secret"
}
}
}
}Are you the author?
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macOS-MCP is a lightweight, open-source Model Context Protocol server that bridges AI agents and the macOS operating system. It enables seamless automation of macOS through LLMs via tasks such as file navigation, application control, UI interaction, browser automation, and system operations.
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npx -y '@google/gemini-cli' 2>&1 | head -1 && echo "✓ Server started successfully"
After testing, let us know if it worked:
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
uv allows ZIP payload obfuscation through parsing differentials
## Impact In versions 0.8.5 and earlier of uv, remote ZIP archives were handled in a streamwise fashion, and file entries were not reconciled against the archive's central directory. This enabled two parser differentials against other Python package installers: 1. An attacker could contrive a ZIP archive that would extract with legitimate contents on some package installers, and malicious contents on others due to multiple local file entries. The attacker could choose which installer to target
uv is vulnerable to arbitrary file write through entry point names
### Impact In versions of uv prior to 0.11.15, when installing a distribution containing an entry point specification (under `console_scripts` or `gui_scripts`), uv would place the generated entry point according to the given name even if doing so resulted in a path outside of the environment's scripts directory. A malicious wheel could use this to place an executable outside of the intended environment, including in a directory already present on the user's `PATH`. This could shadow or overwr
Gemini CLI: Remote Code Execution via workspace trust and tool allowlisting bypasses
# Summary Gemini CLI (`@google/gemini-cli`) and the `run-gemini-cli` GitHub Action are being updated to harden workspace trust and tool allowlisting, in particular when used in untrusted environments like GitHub Actions. This update introduces a breaking change to how non-interactive (headless) environments handle folder trust, which may impact existing CI/CD workflows under specific conditions. # Details Folder Trust in Headless Mode In previous versions, Gemini CLI running in CI environmen
Gemini CLI: Remote Code Execution via workspace trust and tool allowlisting bypasses
# Summary Gemini CLI (`@google/gemini-cli`) and the `run-gemini-cli` GitHub Action are being updated to harden workspace trust and tool allowlisting, in particular when used in untrusted environments like GitHub Actions. This update introduces a breaking change to how non-interactive (headless) environments handle folder trust, which may impact existing CI/CD workflows under specific conditions. # Details Folder Trust in Headless Mode In previous versions, Gemini CLI running in CI environmen
uv vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion through RECORD entries
## Impact Wheel RECORD entries can contain relative paths that traverse outside of the wheel’s installation prefix. In versions 0.11.5 and earlier of uv, these wheels were not rejected on installation and the RECORD was respected without validation on uninstall. uv uses the RECORD to determine files to remove on uninstall. Consequently, a malicious or malformed wheel could induce deletion of arbitrary files outside of the wheel’s installation prefix on uninstall. uv does not use the RECORD fi
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