Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"massive": {
"env": {
"HOME": "<your_home_directory>",
"MASSIVE_API_KEY": "<your_api_key_here>"
},
"command": "<path_to_mcp_massive>"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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:test_tube: This project is experimental and could be subject to breaking changes.
Run this in your terminal to verify the server starts. Then let us know if it worked — your result helps other developers.
npx -y '@anthropic-ai/claude-code' 2>&1 | head -1 && echo "✓ Server started successfully"
After testing, let us know if it worked:
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
Claude Code: Trust Dialog Bypass via Git Worktree Spoofing Allows Arbitrary Code Execution
Claude Code used the git worktree `commondir` file when determining folder trust but did not validate its contents. By crafting a repository with a `commondir` file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, an attacker could bypass the trust dialog and immediately execute malicious hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`. Exploiting this required the victim to clone a malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and for the attacker to know or guess a path the victim had alre
Claude Code: Sandbox Escape via Symlink Following Allows Arbitrary File Write Outside Workspace
Claude Code's sandbox did not prevent sandboxed processes from creating symlinks pointing to locations outside the workspace. When Claude Code subsequently wrote to a path within such a symlink, its unsandboxed process followed the symlink and wrote to the target location outside the workspace without prompting the user for confirmation. This allowed a sandbox escape where neither the sandboxed command nor the unsandboxed app could independently write outside the workspace, but their combination
Claude Code: Insecure System-Wide Configuration Loading Enables Local Privilege Escalation on Windows
On Windows, Claude Code loaded system-wide default configuration from `C:\ProgramData\ClaudeCode\managed-settings.json` without validating directory ownership or access permissions. Because the `ProgramData` directory is writable by non-administrative users by default and the `ClaudeCode` subdirectory was not pre-created or access-restricted, a low-privileged local user could create this directory and place a malicious configuration file that would be automatically loaded for any user launching
Claude Code has a Workspace Trust Dialog Bypass via Repo-Controlled Settings File
Claude Code resolved the permission mode from settings files, including the repo-controlled `.claude/settings.json`, before determining whether to display the workspace trust confirmation dialog. A malicious repository could set `permissions.defaultMode` to `bypassPermissions` in its committed `.claude/settings.json`, causing the trust dialog to be silently skipped on first open. This allowed a user to be placed into a permissive mode without seeing the trust confirmation prompt, making it easie
Claude Code has Sandbox Escape via Persistent Configuration Injection in settings.json
Claude Code's bubblewrap sandboxing mechanism failed to properly protect the .claude/settings.json configuration file when it did not exist at startup. While the parent directory was mounted as writable and .claude/settings.local.json was explicitly protected with read-only constraints, settings.json was not protected if it was missing. This allowed malicious code running inside the sandbox to create this file and inject persistent hooks (such as SessionStart commands) that would execute with ho
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[!IMPORTANT] :test_tube: This project is experimental and could be subject to breaking changes.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides access to the full Massive.com financial data API through an LLM-friendly interface.
Rather than exposing one tool per endpoint, this server gives the LLM three composable tools — search, call, and query — that cover the entire Massive.com API surface. Data can be stored in an in-memory SQLite database, and enriched with built-in financial functions.
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
search_endpoints | Search for API endpoints and built-in functions by natural language query. Returns titles, path patterns, and descriptions. Set detail to "more" for query parameter docs, or "verbose" for full documentation. Use max_results to limit results. |
call_api | Call any Massive.com REST API endpoint. Supports storing results as an in-memory database table (store_as) and applying post-processing functions (apply). Paginated responses include a next-page hint. |
query_data | Run SQL against stored SQLite DB. Supports SHOW TABLES, DESCRIBE <table>, DROP TABLE <table>, CTEs, window functions, and more. Results can also be post-processed with apply. |
Functions can be applied to API results or query output via the apply parameter on call_api and query_data. Use search_endpoints with scope="functions" to discover them.
| Category | Functions |
|---|---|
| Greeks | bs_price, bs_delta, bs_gamma, bs_theta, bs_vega, bs_rho — Black-Scholes option pricing and greeks |
| Returns | simple_return, log_return, cumulative_return, sharpe_ratio, sortino_ratio |
| Technical | sma (simple moving average), ema (exponential moving average) |
The server dynamically indexes all Massive.com API endpoints at startup from llms.txt, so it automatically stays in sync with the API. Coverage includes:
First, install Claude Code
npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code
Install the MCP server, then register it with Claude Code:
# Install the server (one-time — downloads dependencies ahead of time)
uv tool install "mcp_massive @ git+https://github.com/massive-com/mcp_massive@v0.10.0"
# Register with Claude Code
claude mcp add massive -e MASSIVE_API_KEY=your_api_key_here -- mcp_massive
To upgrade to a new version later:
uv tool upgrade mcp_massive
[!NOTE] Upgrading from
uvxoruv run --with? Previous versions recommendeduvx --from ... mcp_massiveoruv run --with. These commands download dependencies on every cold start, which can c