An MCP server for Massive.com Financial Market Data
{
"mcpServers": {
"massive": {
"env": {
"HOME": "<your_home_directory>",
"MASSIVE_API_KEY": "<your_api_key_here>"
},
"command": "<path_to_mcp_massive>"
}
}
}Are you the author?
Add this badge to your README to show your security score and help users find safe servers.
> :test_tube: This project is experimental and could be subject to breaking changes.
Is it safe?
No known CVEs for @anthropic-ai/claude-code. 22 previously resolved.
No authentication — any process on your machine can connect.
MIT. View license →
Is it maintained?
Last commit 0 days ago. 293 stars. 10,155,133 weekly downloads.
Will it work with my client?
Transport: stdio, sse, http. Works with Claude Desktop, Cursor, Claude Code, and most MCP clients.
Run this in your terminal to verify the server starts. Then let us know if it worked — your result helps other developers.
npx -y '@anthropic-ai/claude-code' 2>&1 | head -1 && echo "✓ Server started successfully"
After testing, let us know if it worked:
No open vulnerabilities. 22 fixed CVEs.
CVE-2026-33068FixedClaude Code has a Workspace Trust Dialog Bypass via Repo-Controlled Settings File
Claude Code resolved the permission mode from settings files, including the repo-controlled `.claude/settings.json`, before determining whether to display the workspace trust confirmation dialog. A malicious repository could set `permissions.defaultMode` to `bypassPermissions` in its committed `.claude/settings.json`, causing the trust dialog to be silently skipped on first open. This allowed a user to be placed into a permissive mode without seeing the trust confirmation prompt, making it easie
CVE-2026-25725FixedClaude Code has Sandbox Escape via Persistent Configuration Injection in settings.json
Claude Code's bubblewrap sandboxing mechanism failed to properly protect the .claude/settings.json configuration file when it did not exist at startup. While the parent directory was mounted as writable and .claude/settings.local.json was explicitly protected with read-only constraints, settings.json was not protected if it was missing. This allowed malicious code running inside the sandbox to create this file and inject persistent hooks (such as SessionStart commands) that would execute with ho
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CVE-2026-25724FixedClaude Code has Permission Deny Bypass Through Symbolic Links
Claude Code failed to strictly enforce deny rules configured in settings.json when accessing files through symbolic links. If a user explicitly denied Claude Code access to a file (such as /etc/passwd) and Claude Code had access to a symbolic link pointing to that file, it was possible for Claude Code to read the restricted file through the symlink without triggering deny rule enforcement. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update received this fix automatically. Users performing manual update
CVE-2026-25723FixedClaude Code Vulnerable to Command Injection via Piped sed Command Bypasses File Write Restrictions
Claude Code failed to properly validate commands using piped sed operations with the echo command, allowing attackers to bypass file write restrictions. This vulnerability enabled writing to sensitive directories like the .claude folder and paths outside the project scope. Exploiting this required the ability to execute commands through Claude Code with the "accept edits" feature enabled. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates
CVE-2026-25722FixedClaude Code Vulnerable to Command Injection via Directory Change Bypasses Write Protection
Claude Code failed to properly validate directory changes when combined with write operations to protected folders. By using the `cd` command to navigate into sensitive directories like `.claude`, it was possible to bypass write protection and create or modify files without user confirmation. Reliably exploiting this required the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update received this fix automatically. Users performing manual
CVE-2026-24887FixedClaude Code has a Command Injection in find Command Bypasses User Approval Prompt
Due to an error in command parsing, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompt to trigger execution of untrusted commands through the find command. Reliably exploiting this required the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Claude Code thanks https://hackerone.com/alexbernier for reporting this i
CVE-2026-24053FixedClaude Code has a Path Restriction Bypass via ZSH Clobber which Allows Arbitrary File Writes
Due to a Bash command validation flaw in parsing ZSH clobber syntax, it was possible to bypass directory restrictions and write files outside the current working directory without user permission prompts. Exploiting this required the user to use ZSH and the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Claude Code thanks h
CVE-2026-24052FixedClaude Code has a Domain Validation Bypass which Allows Automatic Requests to Attacker-Controlled Domains
Claude Code contained insufficient URL validation in its trusted domain verification mechanism for WebFetch requests. The application used a `startsWith()` function to validate trusted domains (e.g., `docs.python.org`, `modelcontextprotocol.io`), this could have enabled attackers to register domains like `modelcontextprotocol.io.example.com` that would pass validation. This could enable automatic requests to attacker-controlled domains without user consent, potentially leading to data exfiltrati
CVE-2026-21852FixedClaude Code Leaks Data via Malicious Environment Configuration Before Trust Confirmation
A vulnerability in Claude Code's project-load flow allowed malicious repositories to exfiltrate data including Anthropic API keys before users confirmed trust. If a user started Claude Code in an attacker-controller repository, and the repository included a settings file that set ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to an attacker-controlled endpoint, Claude Code would issue API requests before showing the trust prompt, including potentially leaking the user's API keys. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update
CVE-2025-66032FixedClaude Code Command Validation Bypass Allows Arbitrary Code Execution
Due to errors in parsing shell commands related to $IFS and short CLI flags, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code read-only validation and trigger arbitrary code execution. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to [RyotaK](hxxps://ryotak.net) from [GMO Flatt Secur
CVE-2025-64755Fixed@anthropic-ai/claude-code has Sed Command Validation Bypass that Allows Arbitrary File Writes
Due to an error in sed command parsing, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code read-only validation and write to arbitrary files on the host system. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to Adam Chester - SpecterOps for reporting this issue!
CVE-2025-65099FixedClaude Code vulnerable to command execution prior to startup trust dialog
When using Claude Code with Yarn installed, Yarn config files can trigger code execution when running yarn --version. This could lead to a bypass of the directory trust dialog in Claude Code, as plugins and yarnPath could be executed prior to the user accepting the risks of working in an untrusted directory. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to Benjamin Falle
CVE-2025-59829FixedClaude Code permission deny bypass through symlink
Claude Code failed to account for symlinks when checking permission deny rules. If a user explicitly denied Claude Code access to a file and Claude Code had access to a symlink pointing to that file, it was possible for Claude Code to access the file. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to https://hackerone.com/vinai for reporting this issue!
CVE-2025-59536FixedClaude Code can execute commands prior to the startup trust dialog
Due to a bug in the startup trust dialog implementation, Claude Code could be tricked to execute code contained in a project before the user accepted the startup trust dialog. Exploiting this requires a user to start Claude Code in an untrusted directory. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to https://hackerone.com/avivdon for reporting this issue!
CVE-2025-59828FixedClaude Code Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via Plugin Autoloading with Specific Yarn Versions
When using Claude Code with Yarn installed, Yarn config files can trigger code execution when running `yarn --version`. This could lead to a bypass of the directory trust dialog in Claude Code, as plugins and `yarnPath` could be executed prior to the user accepting the risks of working in an untrusted directory. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to Benjamin F
CVE-2025-59041FixedClaude Code vulnerable to arbitrary code execution caused by maliciously configured git email
At startup, Claude Code constructed a shell command that interpolated the value of `git config user.email` from the current workspace. If an attacker controlled the repository’s Git config (e.g., via a malicious `.git/config`) and set `user.email` to a crafted payload, the unescaped interpolation could trigger arbitrary command execution **before** the user accepted the workspace-trust dialog. The issue affects versions prior to `1.0.105`. The fix in `1.0.105` avoids executing commands built fro
CVE-2025-58764FixedClaude Code rg vulnerability does not protect against approval prompt bypass
Due to an error in command parsing, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompt to trigger execution of an untrusted command. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to the NVIDIA AI Red Team for reporting this issue!
GHSA-ph6w-f82w-28w6FixedClaude Code Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution Due to Insufficient Startup Warning
When Claude Code was started in a new directory, it displayed a warning asking, "Do you trust the files in this folder?". This warning did not properly document that selecting "Yes, proceed" would allow Claude Code to execute files in the folder without additional confirmation. This may not have been clear to a user so we have updated the warning to clarify this functionality. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates a
CVE-2025-55284FixedClaude Code's Permissive Default Allowlist Enables Unauthorized File Read and Network Exfiltration in Claude Code
Due to an overly broad allowlist of safe commands, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompts to read a file and then send file contents over the network without user confirmation. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update received this fix automatically after release. Current users of Claude Code are unaffected, as versions prior to 1.0.24 are deprecated and have been
CVE-2025-54795FixedClaude Code echo command allowed bypass of user approval prompt for command execution
Due to an error in command parsing, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompt to trigger execution of an untrusted command. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update received this fix automatically after release. Current users of Claude Code are unaffected, as versions prior to 1.0.24 are deprecated and have been forced to update. Thank you to Elad Beber (Cymulate) for
CVE-2025-54794FixedClaude Code Research Preview has a Path Restriction Bypass which could allow unauthorized file access
Due to a path validation flaw using prefix matching instead of canonical path comparison, it was possible to bypass directory restrictions and access files outside the CWD. Successful exploitation depends on the presence of (or ability to create) a directory with the same prefix as the CWD and the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update received this fix automatically after release. Current users of Claude Code are unaffecte
CVE-2025-52882FixedClaude Code Improper Authorization via websocket connections from arbitrary origins
Claude Code extensions in VSCode and forks (e.g., Cursor, Windsurf, and VSCodium) and JetBrains IDEs (e.g., IntelliJ, Pycharm, and Android Studio) are vulnerable to unauthorized websocket connections from an attacker when visiting attacker-controlled webpages. Claude Code for VSCode IDE extensions versions 0.2.116 through 1.0.23 are vulnerable. For Jetbrains IDE plugins, Claude Code [beta] versions 0.1.1 through 0.1.8 are vulnerable. In VSCode (and forks), exploitation would allow an attacker
[!IMPORTANT] :test_tube: This project is experimental and could be subject to breaking changes.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides access to the full Massive.com financial data API through an LLM-friendly interface.
Rather than exposing one tool per endpoint, this server gives the LLM four composable tools — search, docs, call, and query — that cover the entire Massive.com API surface. Data can be stored in-memory as DataFrames, queried with SQL, and enriched with built-in financial functions.
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| search_endpoints | Search for API endpoints and built-in functions by natural language query. Returns names, URL patterns, and descriptions. Supports scoping to endpoints, functions, or all. |
| get_endpoint_docs | Get parameter documentation for a specific endpoint. Pass the docs URL from search_endpoints results. |
| call_api | Call any Massive.com REST API endpoint. Supports storing results as an in-memory DataFrame (store_as) and applying post-processing functions (apply). Paginated responses include a next-page hint. |
| query_data | Run SQL against stored DataFrames using SQLite. Supports SHOW TABLES, DESCRIBE <table>, DROP TABLE <table>, CTEs, window functions, and more. Results can also be post-processed with apply. |
Functions can be applied to API results or query output via the apply parameter on call_api and query_data. Use search_endpoints with scope="functions" to discover them.
| Category | Functions |
|---|---|
| Greeks | bs_price, bs_delta, bs_gamma, bs_theta, bs_vega, bs_rho — Black-Scholes option pricing and greeks |
| Returns | simple_return, log_return, cumulative_return, sharpe_ratio, sortino_ratio |
| Technical | sma (simple moving average), ema (exponential moving average) |
The server dynamically indexes all Massive.com API endpoints at startup from llms.txt, so it automatically stays in sync with the API. Coverage includes:
First, install Claude Code
npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code
Install the MCP server, then register it with Claude Code:
# Install the server (one-time — downloads dependencies ahead of time)
uv tool install "mcp_massive @ git+https://github.com/massive-com/mcp_massive@v0.8.8"
# Register with Claude Code
claude mcp add massive -e MASSIVE_API_KEY=your_api_key_here -- mcp_massive
To upgrade to a new version later:
uv tool upgrade mcp_massive
[!NOTE] Upgrading from
uvxoruv run --with? Previous versions recommendeduvx --from ... mcp_massiveor `