This server has been archived and is no longer actively maintained.
MCP Searxng is an MCP server that MCP server for SearXNG integration. Its tool list has not been published yet over stdio, requires no API key, and scores 54/100 on MCPpedia's security, maintenance and efficiency rubric.
Step 1
Install in your client
Config is the same across clients - only the file and path differ.
CD
Supported in Claude Desktopstdio · Node 18+
Paste into ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"mcp-searxng": {
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-searxng"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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[](https://mcppedia.org/s/mcp-searxng)
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What Mcp Searxng does
An MCP server that integrates the SearXNG API, giving AI assistants web search capabilities.
Test This Server
Run this in your terminal to verify the server starts. Then let us know if it worked - your result helps other developers.
npx -y 'mcp-searxng' 2>&1 | head -1 && echo "✓ Server started successfully"
After testing, let us know if it worked:
Scored, not listed
Why this score
Five weighted categories - click any category to see the underlying evidence.
Score breakdown
54/100across 5 weighted dimensions
0255075100
19
11
14
10
−46
Security
Maintenance
Efficiency
Documentation
Compatibility
Categoriesclick a row to see evidence
Security
OSV.dev7 fixed
GHSA-hjwh-xvfw-qrwjmedium · fixedCVSS 5.5
SearXNG Basic Authentication Credentials Exposed Through MCP Logs and JSON-RPC Error Responses
### Summary mcp-searxng version 1.11.0 exposes SearXNG Basic Authentication credentials embedded in the `SEARXNG_URL` environment variable. When the server starts in STDIO mode and an MCP client connects, the complete `SEARXNG_URL`, including its username and password, is sent to the client through an MCP `notifications/message` logging notification. Additionally, when URL validation fails, the complete credential-bearing URL is included in the configuration error. This error is logged throug
CVE-2026-54689medium · fixedCVSS 6.3
SearXNG MCP Server: Additional hardened-mode SSRF bypasses
## Summary `mcp-searxng` has a hardened-mode URL-reading feature intended to prevent `web_url_read` from reaching private or internal network resources. PR #79 appears to address one SSRF class: hostnames that resolve to private or internal addresses under hardened mode. I tested PR #79 locally and confirmed that it blocks the DNS-resolves-to-loopback case. However, several other hardened-mode SSRF bypasses still appear to remain: 1. Redirects from an allowed first-hop URL to a loopback/inte
CVE-2026-54688medium · fixedCVSS 6.5
SearXNG MCP Server is Vulnerable to SSRF in web_url_read: the internal-address guard is disabled by default (MCP_HTTP_HARDEN off)
Ref: https://github.com/ihor-sokoliuk/mcp-searxng/issues/87#issuecomment-4645453694 ### Summary The web_url_read tool fetches a caller-supplied URL server-side and converts it to markdown. An SSRF guard (assertUrlAllowed, which blocks private/loopback/metadata addresses) exists but runs only when MCP_HTTP_HARDEN=true, which is off by default. So in the default configuration there is no internal-address filtering, and an attacker who can influence the URL can make the server fetch internal serv
GHSA-mrvx-jmjw-vggchigh · fixedCVSS 7.1
SearXNG MCP Server: DNS-resolved Private Hostname SSRF in `web_url_read`
## DNS-resolved Private Hostname SSRF in `web_url_read` ### Summary The `web_url_read` MCP tool in `mcp-searxng` is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via DNS rebinding bypass. The `assertUrlAllowed()` function at `src/url-reader.ts:85-93` validates only the syntactic hostname string against a private IP/hostname blocklist without performing DNS resolution. An attacker who controls a domain that resolves to a private or loopback IP address (e.g., via a wildcard DNS service like `
CVE-2026-58485high · fixedCVSS 7.1
SearXNG MCP Server: DNS-resolved Private Hostname SSRF in `web_url_read`
## DNS-resolved Private Hostname SSRF in `web_url_read` ### Summary The `web_url_read` MCP tool in `mcp-searxng` is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via DNS rebinding bypass. The `assertUrlAllowed()` function at `src/url-reader.ts:85-93` validates only the syntactic hostname string against a private IP/hostname blocklist without performing DNS resolution. An attacker who controls a domain that resolves to a private or loopback IP address (e.g., via a wildcard DNS service like `
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Frequently Asked Questions
- Is Mcp Searxng safe to use?
- Mcp Searxng has no known CVEs as of the latest MCPpedia security scan. Authentication requirements were not detected automatically - check the project's documentation before connecting in a shared environment. Licensed under MIT.
- How do I install Mcp Searxng?
- Mcp Searxng supports copy-paste install configs on its MCPpedia page for Claude Desktop, Cursor, and Claude Code. Scroll to the Quick Install section and select your client.
- What AI clients work with Mcp Searxng?
- Mcp Searxng is compatible with claude-desktop, cursor, claude-code. It uses stdio transport.
- Is Mcp Searxng actively maintained?
- Mcp Searxng is actively maintained - last commit was 1 day ago. It has 1,322 GitHub stars.
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