Langflow: BaseFileComponent-based nodes arbitrary file read with RCE exploit

### Summary All components based on `BaseFileComponent` are vulnerable to the following vulnerability: 1. Docling (`DoclingInlineComponent`) 2. Docling Serve (`DoclingRemoteComponent`) 3. Read File (`FileComponent`) 4. NVIDIA Retriever Extraction (`NvidiaIngestComponent`) 5. Video File (`VideoFileComponent`) 6. Unstructured API (`UnstructuredComponent`) For clarity, from now on I'll only refer to Read File component. The Read File node processes user-controlled files. Example scenario is a RAG

Langflow: Unauthenticated DoS through multipart form boundary file upload

### Summary An attacker can send a `/api/v1/files/upload/` request without any authentication token/cookies and abuse a very long multipart form boundary to make the langflow app unusable for all users for an indefinite amount of time. ### Details https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.0.18/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py#L40 The file upload function will try to process the multipart form data even if it is malformed and contains a payload such as an extremely large amount

Langflow: Logout button does not clear session

### Summary The logout button does not clear the session. The previous user stays logged in unless another user explicitly logs in. ### Details Not in auto login mode. Hosted on localhost. `access_token_lf` remains present in both Local Storage and Cookies. `refresh_token_lf` remains present in Cookies. **Root cause:** the `/logout` endpoint deleted the authentication cookies without matching the original `httponly`/`samesite`/`secure`/`domain` parameters, so the browser kept them; additionall

Langflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's Flow

## Summary Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim's flow ID in the request. ## Details The vulnerability exists in the `get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name` helper function in [`src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py` (lines 399-414)](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py#L399C1-L414C67).

Langflow: Unauthenticated file upload leads to DoS (space exhaustion) and information leak

### Summary Unauthenticated users can upload any amount of data to the server without any limitations. No need for any prior knowledge, only network access to Langflow. This can lead to space exhaustion on the server. In adition, in the response, the absolute path of the uploaded file is reported to the attacker, which is an information leak that can assist in chaining other primitives. Tested on commit 2d67402b1dbaefcbce85a244d4a6cd5e4bda1cfe ### Details Code is in `langflow/api/v1/[endpoin