LiteLLM: Custom Code Guardrails production endpoints bypass code safety checks

### Impact LiteLLM's Custom Code Guardrails production create/update paths did not apply the same sandboxing and validation used by the test endpoint. A privileged user with access to create or update guardrails could submit custom Python code that executed in the LiteLLM proxy environment. In deployments without a configured master key, callers could be treated as proxy administrators, making this reachable without intended administrative authorization. This could allow arbitrary code execut

LiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough Fallback

### Impact LiteLLM's MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint could allow an unauthenticated attacker to establish an authenticated MCP session using an arbitrary Bearer token. The MCP auth handler supported OAuth2 passthrough for upstream MCP servers, but the fallback path could replace failed LiteLLM key validation with an empty `UserAPIKeyAuth()` object. This allowed requests with a fabricated `Authorization` header to reach MCP tooling without a valid LiteLLM key. An attacker could use this to list a

LiteLLM: Local file read via request-supplied OIDC file references

### Impact LiteLLM's `/health/test_connection` endpoint resolved request-supplied environment and OIDC file references in `litellm_params`. A proxy administrator, or another privileged caller with permission to test model connections, could cause LiteLLM to read files from the local filesystem via an `oidc/file/` reference. Because exploitation requires privileged proxy access, this is treated as a defense-in-depth issue rather than a cross-tenant privilege bypass. ### Patches The issue is f

LiteLLM: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in Skills archive extraction

### Impact LiteLLM Skills archive extraction did not sufficiently validate file paths from uploaded skill ZIP archives. An authenticated user with access to LiteLLM LLM API routes, or a key whose `allowed_routes` includes `/v1/skills`, `anthropic_routes`, or `llm_api_routes`, could upload a crafted skill archive containing path traversal entries. When the skill was processed for execution, those entries could be written outside the intended extraction/staging directory. This could allow arbitr

LiteLLM allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint

LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint. While the endpoint correctly restricts users to updating only their own account, it does not restrict which fields may be changed. A user who can reach this endpoint can set their role to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative access to LiteLLM including all users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history. Users with the org_admin role have legitimate access to this endpoint and can exploit this