LiteLLM: Authentication Bypass via Host Header Injection

### Impact A Host-header parsing flaw in the LiteLLM proxy could, under specific conditions, allow unauthenticated access to protected management routes. The auth layer derived the effective route from `request.url.path` in `litellm/proxy/auth/auth_utils.py::get_request_route()`, which Starlette reconstructs from the `Host` header. A crafted `Host` could therefore make the auth gate evaluate a different route from the one FastAPI dispatched. **Most deployments are not affected.** The bypass

LiteLLM: Authentication bypass via OIDC userinfo cache key collision

### Impact When JWT authentication is enabled (`enable_jwt_auth: true`), the OIDC userinfo cache uses `token[:20]` as the cache key. JWT headers produced by the same signing algorithm generate identical first 20 characters. This configuration option is not enabled by default. **Most instances are not affected.** An unauthenticated attacker can craft a token whose first 20 characters match a legitimate user's cached token. On cache hit, the attacker inherits the legitimate user's identity and

LiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verification

### Impact A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy an

litellm vulnerable to remote code execution based on using eval unsafely

BerriAI/litellm version v1.35.8 contains a vulnerability where an attacker can achieve remote code execution. The vulnerability exists in the `add_deployment` function, which decodes and decrypts environment variables from base64 and assigns them to `os.environ`. An attacker can exploit this by sending a malicious payload to the `/config/update` endpoint, which is then processed and executed by the server when the `get_secret` function is triggered. This requires the server to use Google KMS and

LiteLLM has Server-Side Template Injection vulnerability in /completions endpoint

BerriAI/litellm is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) via the `/completions` endpoint. The vulnerability arises from the `hf_chat_template` method processing the `chat_template` parameter from the `tokenizer_config.json` file through the Jinja template engine without proper sanitization. Attackers can exploit this by crafting malicious `tokenizer_config.json` files that execute arbitrary code on the server.