Natural language interface to OpenCTI threat intelligence. Built with Claude Code for $22. Part of Cooper Cyber Coffee.
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Opencti_mcp_server is an MCP server that natural language interface to OpenCTI threat intelligence. Built with Claude Code for $22. Part of Cooper Cyber Coffee. Its tool list has not been published yet over stdio and sse, requires no API key, and scores 54/100 on MCPpedia's security, maintenance and efficiency rubric.
Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"opencti": {
"env": {
"OPENCTI_URL": "http://localhost:8080",
"OPENCTI_TOKEN": "your-api-token-here",
"OPENCTI_SSL_VERIFY": "false"
},
"args": [
"-m",
"opencti_mcp"
],
"command": "/full/path/to/venv/bin/python"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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This server supports HTTP transport. Be the first to test it — help the community know if it works.
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
vLLM: Completion prompt lists fan out into unbounded engine requests
## Summary The `/v1/completions` request model accepts `prompt` as a list of text prompts or a list of token-id prompts without any outer prompt-count bound. The serving path turns each element into a separate engine input, creates one engine generator per element, merges all generators, and allocates a response slot per prompt. An authenticated API client can therefore turn one request into an attacker-chosen number of backend subrequests before any aggregate request-count budget is enforced.
vLLM has Remote DoS via Invalid Recovered Token Reinjection
## Summary A frontend-legal multi-request speculative workload can make vLLM produce an out-of-vocabulary recovered token equal to `vocab_size`, convert that value to `-1` when choosing the next live token for a request, and then feed that `-1` back into the next drafter input ids. On Qwen3 GPTQ this reaches the worker-side drafting / attention path and crashes the engine with a GPU `device-side assert`. The same issue is reachable through the public gRPC request surface by sending a specific
vLLM: OOM Denial of Service via Audio Decompression Bomb
### Summary vLLM's `/v1/audio/transcriptions` endpoint limits compressed upload size but not decoded PCM output. A 25MB OPUS file expands to ~14.9GB of float32 PCM at decode time. Tested on vLLM v0.19.0. ### Details `SpeechToTextProcessor` rejects uploads over `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB` (default 25MB) based on compressed byte length, but the audio decoder in `audio.py` accumulates all decoded frames into memory with no size limit before returning: ```python # speech_to_text.py L184-189
>= 0source →vLLM: incomplete CVE-2026-22778 fix leaks PIL repr addresses via Anthropic router
# vLLM: incomplete CVE-2026-22778 fix leaks PIL repr addresses via the Anthropic API router **Researcher:** Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research **Severity:** CVSS 3.1 5.3 (Medium) `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` **Target:** https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm --- ## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-22778 / GHSA-4r2x-xpjr-7cvv (PRs #31987 and #32319) introduced `sanitize_message` and applied it at four FastAPI exception-handling sites in the O
>= 0source →vLLM: GGUF dequantize kernel int truncation exposes uninitialized GPU memory in multi-tenant serving
## Summary Integer truncation of tensor dimensions in vLLM's GGUF dequantize kernels (`csrc/quantization/gguf/gguf_kernel.cu`) causes partial tensor processing. The output tensor is allocated at full size via `torch::empty` (uninitialized memory), but the dequantize CUDA kernel processes only a truncated number of elements. The unfilled portion of the output tensor retains whatever was previously in GPU memory. In multi-tenant inference deployments, this residual GPU memory may contain tensor d
>= 0.5.5source →Click any tool to inspect its schema.
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Connect Claude Desktop to OpenCTI for AI-augmented threat intelligence analysis
🎉 What's New in v0.4.2 Expanded IOC Enrichment: The
search_observabletool now auto-detects and searches 6 observable types - IPv4, IPv6, domains, URLs, emails, and file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256). No more guessing which tool to use! Quick Links | Release Notes
⚡ Getting Started (First Time Users):
🎯 Core Functionality:
🔧 Configuration & Customization:
🔒 Security & Compliance (CRITICAL):
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