Detects and obfuscates sensitive data before it reaches AI systems — clipboard, CLI, and MCP server
Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"pastewatch": {
"args": [
"mcp"
],
"command": "pastewatch-cli"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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Detects and obfuscates sensitive data before it reaches AI systems — clipboard monitoring, CLI scanner, MCP server, API proxy, shell guard hooks, and VS Code extension.
No automated test available for this server. Check the GitHub README for setup instructions.
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
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Detects and obfuscates sensitive data before it reaches AI systems — clipboard monitoring, CLI scanner, MCP server, API proxy, shell guard hooks, and VS Code extension.
It operates before paste, not after submission.
If sensitive data never enters the prompt, the incident does not exist.
Principiis obsta - resist the beginnings.
Pastewatch intervenes at the earliest irreversible boundary: the moment data leaves the user's control.
Once pasted into an AI system, data cannot be reliably recalled, audited, or constrained.
Pastewatch refuses that transition.
Every AI agent sends your file contents, command outputs, and tool results to a cloud API. If those contain secrets, the secrets leave your machine — silently, irreversibly, and into infrastructure you don't control.
Pastewatch makes secret leakage structurally impossible without breaking any agent functionality:
What the agent does What actually happens
────────────────── ──────────────────────
Read a file with secrets → MCP returns placeholders, secrets stay in RAM
Run a bash command with DSN → Guard blocks before execution
Send tool results to API → Proxy redacts secrets from the request body
Write code with placeholders → MCP resolves originals locally on write-back
The agent works normally. It reads files, runs commands, writes code. It just never sees the real values — and neither does the cloud.
No behavioral rules. No trust assumptions. No ML. The architecture prevents the leak.
pastewatch-cli launch claude and every layer is active. No manual setup, no env vars, no second terminalPastewatch started as a clipboard monitor — scan before paste, replace secrets with placeholders. It evolved into a full secret protection stack for AI agent workflows:
| Layer | What it does | How it works |
|---|---|---|
| Clipboard monitor | Scans before paste | macOS menubar app, replaces secrets in clipboard |
| CLI scanner | Scans files, directories, git diffs | pastewatch-cli scan --dir . |
| MCP server | Redacted read/write for AI agents | Agent sees placeholders, originals stay in RAM |
| Shell guard | Blocks secrets in commands and file access | Pre-execution hook for Claude Code, Cline, Cursor, Windsurf, Continue, Amazon Q |
| API proxy | Redacts secrets from outbound API traffic | Sits between agent and cloud, s |