A lightweight sandboxing tool for enforcing filesystem and network restrictions on arbitrary processes at the OS level, without requiring a container.
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Sandbox Runtime is an MCP server that a lightweight sandboxing tool for enforcing filesystem and network restrictions on arbitrary processes at the OS level, without requiring a container. Its tool list has not been published yet over stdio and sse, requires no API key, and scores 66/100 on MCPpedia's security, maintenance and efficiency rubric.
Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"filesystem": {
"args": [
"-y",
"@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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A lightweight sandboxing tool for enforcing filesystem and network restrictions on arbitrary processes at the OS level, without requiring a container.
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npx -y '@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime' 2>&1 | head -1 && echo "✓ Server started successfully"
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Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
Anthropic Sandbox Runtime Incorrectly Implemented Network Sandboxing
Due to a bug in sandboxing logic, `sandbox-runtime` did not properly enforce a network sandbox if the sandbox policy did not configure any allowed domains. This could allow sandboxed code to make network requests outside of the sandbox. A patch for this was released in v0.0.16. Thank you to https://github.com/bendrucker for reporting this issue!
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A lightweight sandboxing tool for enforcing filesystem and network restrictions on arbitrary processes at the OS level, without requiring a container.
srt uses native OS sandboxing primitives (sandbox-exec on macOS, bubblewrap on Linux) and proxy-based network filtering. It can be used to sandbox the behaviour of agents, local MCP servers, bash commands and arbitrary processes.
Beta Research Preview
The Sandbox Runtime is a research preview developed for Claude Code to enable safer AI agents. It's being made available as an early open source preview to help the broader ecosystem build more secure agentic systems. As this is an early research preview, APIs and configuration formats may evolve. We welcome feedback and contributions to make AI agents safer by default!
npm install -g @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime
# Network restrictions
$ srt "curl anthropic.com"
Running: curl anthropic.com
<html>...</html> # Request succeeds
$ srt "curl example.com"
Running: curl example.com
Connection blocked by network allowlist # Request blocked
# Filesystem restrictions
$ srt "cat README.md"
Running: cat README.md
# Anthropic Sandb... # Current directory access allowed
$ srt "cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa"
Running: cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa
cat: /Users/ollie/.ssh/id_rsa: Operation not permitted # Specific file blocked
This package provides a standalone sandbox implementation that can be used as both a CLI tool and a library. It's designed with a secure-by-default philosophy tailored for common developer use cases: processes start with minimal access, and you explicitly poke only the holes you need.
Key capabilities:
A key use case is sandboxing Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers to restrict their capabilities. For example, to sandbox the filesystem MCP server:
Without sandboxing (.mcp.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"filesystem": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem"]
}
}
}
With sandboxing (.mcp.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"filesystem": {
"command": "srt",
"args": ["npx", "-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem"]
}
}
}
Then configure restrictions in ~/.srt-settings.json:
{
"filesystem": {
"denyRead": [],
"allowWrite": ["."],
"denyWrite": ["~/sensitive-folder"]
},
"network": {
"allowedDomains": [],
"deniedDomains": []
}
}
Now the MCP server will be blocked from writing to the denied path:
> Write a file to ~/sensitive-folder
✗ Error: EPERM: operation not permitted, open '/Users/ollie/sensitive-folder/test.txt'
The sandbox uses OS-level primitives to enforce restrictions that apply to the entire process tree:
sandbox-exec with dynamically generated Seatbelt profilessrt-sandbox local user account, with a Windows Filtering Platform egress fence keyed on that account's SID and per-session explicit ACEs on the working tree![0d1c612947c798aef48e6ab4beb7e8544da9d41a-4096x2305](https://github.com/user-atta