Secure MCP Gateway - Setup Admin level gateway functionality for MCP servers - with guardrails at each MCP server to overcome multiple security issues with using MCPs
Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"Enkrypt Secure MCP Gateway": {
"env": {
"ENKRYPT_USER_ID": "6469a670-1d64-4da5-b2b3-790de21ac726",
"ENKRYPT_PROJECT_ID": "3c09f06c-1f0d-4153-9ac5-366397937641",
"ENKRYPT_GATEWAY_KEY": "2W8UupCkazk4SsOcSu_1hAbiOgPdv0g-nN9NtfZyg-rvYGat"
},
"args": [
"run",
"--rm",
"-i",
"-e",
"MCP_TRANSPORT=stdio",
"-v",
"C:\\Users\\<user>\\.enkrypt\\docker:/app/.enkrypt/docker",
"secure-mcp-gateway"
],
"command": "docker"
}
}
}Are you the author?
Add this badge to your README to show your security score and help users find safe servers.
📖 Featured Blog Post: Learn how the Secure MCP Gateway prevents top attacks and vulnerabilities in our latest blog: > How Enkrypt's Secure MCP Gateway and MCP Scanner Prevent Top Attacks > Discover real-world attack scenarios, security best practices, and how our gateway protects your AI applications.
This server supports HTTP transport. Be the first to test it — help the community know if it works.
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
uv vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion through RECORD entries
## Impact Wheel RECORD entries can contain relative paths that traverse outside of the wheel’s installation prefix. In versions 0.11.5 and earlier of uv, these wheels were not rejected on installation and the RECORD was respected without validation on uninstall. uv uses the RECORD to determine files to remove on uninstall. Consequently, a malicious or malformed wheel could induce deletion of arbitrary files outside of the wheel’s installation prefix on uninstall. uv does not use the RECORD fi
uv allows ZIP payload obfuscation through parsing differentials
### Impact In versions 0.9.5 and earlier of uv, ZIP archives were handled in a manner that enabled two parsing differentials against other components of the Python packaging ecosystem: 1. Central directory entries in a ZIP archive can contain comment fields. However, uv would assume that these fields were not present, since they aren't widely used. Consequently, a ZIP archive could be constructed where uv would interpret the contents of a central directory comment field as ZIP control structur
uv has differential in tar extraction with PAX headers
### Impact In versions 0.9.4 and earlier of uv, tar archives containing PAX headers with file size overrides were not handled properly. As a result, an attacker could contrive a source distribution (as a tar archive) that would extract differently when installed via uv versus other Python package installers. The underlying parsing differential here originates with astral-tokio-tar, which disclosed this vulnerability as CVE-2025-62518. In practice, the impact of this vulnerability is **low**:
uv allows ZIP payload obfuscation through parsing differentials
## Impact In versions 0.8.5 and earlier of uv, remote ZIP archives were handled in a streamwise fashion, and file entries were not reconciled against the archive's central directory. This enabled two parser differentials against other Python package installers: 1. An attacker could contrive a ZIP archive that would extract with legitimate contents on some package installers, and malicious contents on others due to multiple local file entries. The attacker could choose which installer to target
Be the first to review
Have you used this server?
Share your experience — it helps other developers decide.
Sign in to write a review.
Others in security
An evil MCP server used for redteam testing
AI-powered reverse engineering assistant that bridges IDA Pro with language models through MCP.
Proof primitive for AI agents on MultiversX. Anchor file hashes on-chain as verifiable proofs.
Security-first platform for AI agents. 38 specialized agents, 15 AI-powered extensions, zero-knowledge multi-agent orchestration. SENTINEL WAF, Ed25519 auth, 2.6M grounding facts.
MCP Security Weekly
Get CVE alerts and security updates for Secure Mcp Gateway and similar servers.
Start a conversation
Ask a question, share a tip, or report an issue.
Sign in to join the discussion.

📖 Featured Blog Post: Learn how the Secure MCP Gateway prevents top attacks and vulnerabilities in our latest blog:
How Enkrypt's Secure MCP Gateway and MCP Scanner Prevent Top Attacks
Discover real-world attack scenarios, security best practices, and how our gateway protects your AI applications.
This Secure MCP Gateway is built with authentication, automatic tool discovery, caching, and guardrail enforcement.
It sits between your MCP client and MCP servers. So, by it's nature it itself also acts as an MCP server as well as an MCP client :)
When your MCP client connects to the Gateway, it acts as an MCP server. When the Gateway connects to the actual MCP server, it acts as an MCP client.
Also see:

Below are the list of features Enkrypt AI Secure MCP Gateway provides:
Authentication: We use Unique Key to authenticate with the Gateway. We also use Enkrypt API Key if you want to protect your MCPs with Enkrypt Guardrails. Additionally, a secure admin_apikey (256-character random string) is automatically generated for administrative REST API operations.
Ease of use: You can configure all your MCP servers locally in the config file or better yet in Enkrypt (Coming soon) and use them in the Gateway by using their name
Dynamic Tool Discovery: The Gateway discovers tools from the MCP servers dynamically and makes them available to the MCP client
Restrict Tool Invocation: If you don't want all tools to be accessible of a an MCP server, you can restrict them by explicitly mentioning the tools in the Gateway config so that only the allowed tools are accessible to the MCP client
Caching: We cac