Built for security professionals, developers, and DevSecOps teams who need reliable vulnerability intelligence integrated directly into their development workflow.
Config is the same across clients — only the file and path differ.
{
"mcpServers": {
"vulnerability-intelligence": {
"env": {
"FETCH_URL": "https://vulnerability-intelligence-mcp-server-edb8b15494e8.herokuapp.com/sse"
},
"args": [
"-y",
"@modelcontextprotocol/server-fetch"
],
"command": "npx"
}
}
}Are you the author?
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A modular Model Context Protocol (MCP) server providing comprehensive security vulnerability intelligence tools including CVE lookup, EPSS scoring, CVSS calculation, exploit detection, and Python package vulnerability checking.
This server supports HTTP transport. Be the first to test it — help the community know if it works.
Five weighted categories — click any category to see the underlying evidence.
uv vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion through RECORD entries
## Impact Wheel RECORD entries can contain relative paths that traverse outside of the wheel’s installation prefix. In versions 0.11.5 and earlier of uv, these wheels were not rejected on installation and the RECORD was respected without validation on uninstall. uv uses the RECORD to determine files to remove on uninstall. Consequently, a malicious or malformed wheel could induce deletion of arbitrary files outside of the wheel’s installation prefix on uninstall. uv does not use the RECORD fi
uv allows ZIP payload obfuscation through parsing differentials
### Impact In versions 0.9.5 and earlier of uv, ZIP archives were handled in a manner that enabled two parsing differentials against other components of the Python packaging ecosystem: 1. Central directory entries in a ZIP archive can contain comment fields. However, uv would assume that these fields were not present, since they aren't widely used. Consequently, a ZIP archive could be constructed where uv would interpret the contents of a central directory comment field as ZIP control structur
uv has differential in tar extraction with PAX headers
### Impact In versions 0.9.4 and earlier of uv, tar archives containing PAX headers with file size overrides were not handled properly. As a result, an attacker could contrive a source distribution (as a tar archive) that would extract differently when installed via uv versus other Python package installers. The underlying parsing differential here originates with astral-tokio-tar, which disclosed this vulnerability as CVE-2025-62518. In practice, the impact of this vulnerability is **low**:
uv allows ZIP payload obfuscation through parsing differentials
## Impact In versions 0.8.5 and earlier of uv, remote ZIP archives were handled in a streamwise fashion, and file entries were not reconciled against the archive's central directory. This enabled two parser differentials against other Python package installers: 1. An attacker could contrive a ZIP archive that would extract with legitimate contents on some package installers, and malicious contents on others due to multiple local file entries. The attacker could choose which installer to target
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